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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new mechanism to securely
extend systems data collection software with potentially un-
trusted third-party code. Unlike existing tools which run ex-
tension modules or plugins directly inside the monitored end-
point (the guest), we run plugins inside a specially crafted
sandbox, so as to protect the guest as well as the software
core. To get the right mix of accessibility and constraints
required for systems data extraction, we create our sandbox
by combining multiple features exported by an unmodified
kernel. We have tested its applicability by successfully sand-
boxing plugins of an opensourced data collection software
for containerized guest systems. We have also verified its
security posture in terms of successful containment of sev-
eral exploits, which would have otherwise directly impacted
a guest, if shipped inside third-party plugins.
1 Introduction
Systems data collection is an essential component in every
cloud monitoring setup [108]. There exist several systems
monitoring and data collection tools, like Collectd [39] and
Nagios [16], which extract system-level state, such as the
inventory of all running applications, open connections, etc.
Such tools typically follow an extensible model, presumably
to gain widespread adoption, where code from users or third-
party developers can be incorporated to run with the core
software, in the form of modules, plugins, classes, etc. (col-
lectively referred to as ‘plugins’ from here onwards). These
plugins implement state-specific collection logic to extract the
relevant system state, for example, querying the procfs to
gather process-level metrics, or querying the package database
to gather names and versions of installed packages. Figure 1(a)
shows a typical data collection setup in container clouds. Here,
the core monitoring software, running on a host, commands
and controls different data collection plugins. As shown in
the figure, these plugins may be host-resident, or running on
the monitored endpoints, called guests.
Since these plugins usually interface directly with the guest
and the host, the plugins have the ability to impact their oper-
ations. The plugins may be buggy or malicious, causing data
corruption or resource hogging, for example. There exist offi-
cial CVE entries 1 for vulnerabilities in plugins leaking sensi-
tive information (such as application login credentials) [7–9],
enabling arbitrary command execution [2,4,6], causing Denial
of Service (DoS) [1, 5, 11], amongst other security concerns.
1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database for publicly-known
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. https://cve.mitre.org/
Figure 1: Systems data collection methodology in a container cloud. The
monitoring software core (C) interfaces with several plugins (P). (a) Existing
approaches: Direct plugin execution at host as well as inside monitored guest.
(b) Our approach: Sandboxed plugin execution outside the guest’s context.
In case of the popular Nagios montoring software, plugin
vulnerabilities account for 23% of all CVEs associated with
Nagios2. Many of the remainder vulnerabilities in the soft-
ware core are further exploitable by potentially malicious
plugins, by attacking the software core’s otherwise legitimate
interface to communicate with external entities, such as via
crafted payloads [10, 43].
Clearly, opening a tool to interface with third-party plugins
increases its vulnerability exposure, which needs extra guard-
ing beyond the tool developer’s responsibility of securing the
core software. In order to understand how existing tools deal
with this, we performed a survey of the security posture of
their extensibility models. We observed that a few tools do
incorporate some security emphasis in their design, such as en-
cryption, authentication and authorization [38,70, 74]. While
a few others publish certain security-oriented guidelines for
plugin authors to follow, and end users to ensure, such as
non-root operations, directory permission lock-down, input
validation, and source code review [85, 86, 88, 101, 107]. But,
most tools distance themselves from a direct impact by trans-
ferring the security onus onto the guest. A common trend
is to follow a client-server separation model [86, 95, 105],
where the host running the software core is protected from
third-party plugins running inside the guest.
This guests’ exposure to third-party plugins means that
the guest still remains susceptible to malicious or vulnerable
plugins (such as the aforementioned CVEs). There is thus a
need for a better solution, one that protects both–the monitor-
ing software core running on the host, as well as the moni-
2 Stats for the opensourced Nagios-core software only; not the Nagios XI
enterprise product. From https://www.cvedetails.com/
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tored guest–from the plugins’ side-effects. The challenge in
securely running untrusted system-state-extraction plugins,
lies in balancing the levels of accessibility and constraints
afforded to them. One one hand, we need to properly sandbox
untrusted third-party plugin code, so that it can’t harm either
the guest or the host, either directly (e.g., subverting processes,
or leaking secrets), or indirectly (e.g. DoS, or acting as botnet).
And, from an accessibility perspective, we need to provide
these plugins secure access to privileged resources outside
the walls of a typical sandbox, specifically–the target guest’s
memory and disk state.
In this paper, we present a new technique to safely run
potentially adversarial third-party plugins, with systems mon-
itoring and data collection software. Our approach to enable
secure extensibility is to run extension modules or plugins
outside the guest context, at the host, to protect the guest and
avoid any guest modifications. And to protect the host as well
as the software core, we isolate these plugins in a specially
crafted sandbox, as shown in Figure 1(b), The sandbox isola-
tion, as well as secure access to the guest’s state, is achieved
by combining multiple constructs of an unmodified kernel.
We follow the principle of least privilege [102] in our sand-
box design, starting with running the plugins as unprivileged
entities, then giving them access rights via namespaces and
capabilities, and finally restricting their impact potential via
seccomp and netfilter. In addition to these five constructs
for access controls, we also use cgroups to enforce resource
constraints on the plugin sandbox.
We highlight our sandbox’ strong security posture by run-
ning exploits across 10 different attack vectors inside it, and
verifying it’s ability to contain all exploits, which would have
otherwise directly impacted the guest (or the host), had they
been shipped inside third-party plugins. We demonstrate our
sandbox’ applicability by using it to isolate plugins of an exist-
ing container monitoring software, with most plugins running
unmodified, while the rest requiring only minor modifications.
We also measure the overhead our sandbox introduces to a
normal systems data collection flow, in terms of sandbox cre-
ation latency (344ms), running time degradation (an increase
from 26ms to 30ms per monitoring cycle), and resource con-
sumption (zero overhead).
While we focus on containers as our target runtime, the
sandboxing technique employed is equally applicable for se-
curely extending in-VM or host-local data collection software.
One difference from the container guest targets is that the plu-
gins would continue to operate inside the VM (or the host),
but isolated in the same sandbox as presented in this paper,
while accessing the VM’s (or the host’s) state securely.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• A survey of the extensibility and security models of
popular system state extraction tools.
• A read-only permissive, yet isolated sandbox, created by
combining constructs from an unmodified Linux kernel.
• An sidecar-container-based plugin sandbox prototype
implementation, which we have opensourced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
a survey of existing systems data collection tools in Section
2. We clarify our threat model in Section 3, the design of our
sandbox in Section 4, and a prototype implementation using
sidecar containers in Section 5. In Section 6, we evaluate
the security, applicability and overhead of our sandbox, and
compare it with existing approaches in Section 7.
2 Security Posture of Existing Tools
In the context of cloud monitoring, we performed a survey
of 17 popular tools which can be employed for container
data collection, to understand the security posture of their
extensibility offerings. Table 1 compares them in terms of a
tool’s extensibility model, the associated security concerns
which may arise while running third-party code, as well as
any security emphasis in the tool’s design to protect against
untrusted code. The table cells mention whether and how a
property is applicable to a tool (as a ‘Y’ (yes), or a ‘N’ (no)).
The way in which a tool supports extensibility is mentioned
in the corresponding cell of column 2. Different tools use dif-
ferent terminology for their extensibility mechanism- plugins,
classes, packages, integrations, exporters, instrumentation li-
braries, etc. No security concerns are flagged (‘N’ for cells
in columns 4 and 5) for tools which either (i) do not provide
any, or only a limited (alpha/preview only) support for ex-
tensibility (e.g., Aqua, Cadvisor, Heapster), or (ii) support
extensibility not for data collection, but other higher level
rules and security policies, such as network isolation rules, se-
curity checklists, etc. (e.g., Twistlock, Neuvector), or (iii) do
not interface directly with the target endpoint (e.g., Anchore
and Clair (image copy scanning), Tenable (port scanning)).
In terms of safeguards against third-party plugins, we can
see in column 3 that a few tools, such as Collectd and Sensu,
do incorporate some security emphasis in their design, such
as encryption, authentication and authorization [38, 70, 74].
Prometheus publishes best practices for writing exporters,
instrumentation, and labeling for the data collection out-
put flowing from the guest to the host [94]. Others, such
as Nagios, Tenable, and New Relic, publish some security-
oriented guidelines for plugin authors to follow, and end users
to ensure—such as ensuring non-root operations, directory
permission lock-down, input validation, and source code re-
view [85,88, 101, 107]
Despite the varying degree of security emphasis, potential
security concerns exist on the guest and/or the host side (a
’Y’ in the column 4/5 cells) depending upon the extensible
tool’s design, in terms of the environment (in-guest or on-
host) in which the plugins are supposed to run. An impact
may be direct- when plugins run as root, or indirect- such
as a fork bomb, botnet, DoS kind of behaviour. Tool-specific
reasoning behind any security concerns are mentioned in the
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Figure 2: Plugin sandbox design. The monitoring software core
(C) running on the host, interfaces with the data collection plugin (P)
running outside the guest context in a sandbox. The numbered labels
represent the sequence of operations performed to isolate the plugin
via namespacing (1), de-privileging (2) and cgroup-ing (3), as well
as to enable secure access to the guest’s disk, memory, and network
state (Steps 4-6) via a blend of visibility, capability, and constraints.
containment of any potential exposure which capabilities may
introduce. We also ran the relevant exploits and confirmed
their failure to cause a break-out (Section 6.1).
4 Design
The challenge in securely running untrusted system-state-
extraction plugins, lies in balancing the levels of accessibility
and constraints afforded to the them. In terms of specific
restrictions, we want to prevent the plugins from: (i) impact-
ing the guest’s and the host’s execution: this includes direct
impact such as process subversion, as well as indirect interfer-
ence such as DoS via resource hogging, (ii) communicating
with the outside world: leaking sensitive information or act-
ing as a botnet, and (iii) leaking information to host-local
accomplices. And, from an accessibility perspective, we need
to provide these plugins secure access to privileged resources
outside the walls of a typical sandbox, specifically–the target
guest’s memory and disk state.
To get this desired accessibility-constraint blend in our
sandbox, we tap into the kernel to pick relevant constructs
and fine tune them. As a brief description of the sandbox
design, we use namespaces-based view abstraction [19] to
isolate the plugins away into a separate environment than the
target guest’s. Selective access to the target guest’s environ-
ment is provided to the plugins via namespace sharing [21].
The plugins are run as unprivileged entities, with read-only
access to privileged guest state enabled via capabilities-based
selective power conferral [18]. Finally, the plugins’ impact
potential is restricted by using seccomp-based syscall filter-
ing [20], netfilter-based network packet filtering [17], and
cgroups-based resource limits [3].
Figure 2 shows the overall design of our sandbox in a
containerized environment, numbered to reflect the sequence
of operations performed to isolate the plugin (Steps 1-3), as
well as to enable secure access to guest’s state (Steps 4-6).
We detail the sandbox build operations below.
1. View Isolation. First, the plugin is put into its own set of
namespaces (aka the sandbox), separate from the the guest and
host. It can thus only view its private set of processes, mount-
points, network devices, user/group IDs, and inter-process
communication objects. This isolates the plugin away, and
prevents it from having any communication with entities out-
side its sandbox. This includes communication via the filesys-
tem, the network, or through inter-process communication
mechanisms such as shared memory or message queues.
2. De-privileging. Next, following the principle of least priv-
ilege [102], the plugin is made an unprivileged entity, by
mapping its user ID inside its sandbox’ namespace to a non-
root user ID on the host. This takes away a substantial amount
of power from the plugins to alter system state (which it is
awarded access to, starting from Step 4 onwards).
3. Resource Isolation. The sandbox is then put in a separate
cgroup for resource isolation. Limits can thus be enforced
on the plugin’s process count, CPU, memory and disk usage,
preventing it from indirectly impacting the guest and the host.
Now, since the plugin is in its own set of namespaces and
cgroup’ed, it can not harm the guest or the host, under the
assumptions of Section 3.1 However, this also means that it
can not ‘see’ the target guest state, which it needs access to
for carrying out its data extraction task. Since data-collection
plugins essentially extract state residing in memory or disk,
we thus need to give the sandboxed plugin secure read-only
access to guest state, as shown in steps 4-6 in Figure 3
4. Access to disk state. Isolated in its own mount namespace,
the plugin cannot see the guest’s disk-level system state such
as configuration files, logs, package databases, etc. Thus, to be
able to access this state, the guest container’s root filesystem
(rootfs) is mounted read-only inside the sandbox.
But, since the plugin’s and the guest’s user IDs are dif-
ferent, the plugin may be unable to read the guest’s files in
the mounted rootfs, because of discretionary-access-control
(DAC) permission checks. The plugin sandbox is thus granted
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capability to see guest con-
tainer’s files (only reads, no writes).
Now, while the plugin expects to find the relevant files
at paths relative to the root directory (‘/’), the actual state
exists in the mounted guest rootfs (say at ‘/some/location/’).
Thus, the execution environment should be set up to point
to the correct root directory, i.e. chroot(‘/some/location’),
so that the plugin and any imported libraries can work as-is,
believing they are operating on the guest’s ‘/’. But, since an
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unprivileged user (and thus the plugin) can’t call the chroot
syscall, CAP_ SYS_CHROOT capability is also granted to
the sandbox to enable this view change during data collection.
5. Access to memory state. Similar to the mount namespace
restriction, since the plugin is in its separate PID namespace,
it cannot see the guest’s process state. The guest container’s
PID namespace is thus shared with the plugin sandbox, giving
it access to the guest’s memory state via procfs.
However, despite the read-permission-check exception
granted in Step 4, the plugin can still not see the files
or sockets opened by the guest processes. Basically, read-
ing a process’ open files or sockets, by dereferencing
/proc/<pid>/fd/* symlinks, requires that the ptrace access
mode PTRACE_MODE_READ (less powerful, for read-only
operations) be set, amongst other flags. But there is no di-
rect mechanism to grant just these credentials to a userspace
entity. Thus, as the nearest alternative, the more-powerful
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability is granted to the unprivileged
plugin, in order to read such memory state. This is indeed an
overkill and an artifact of the coarse grained capabilities in the
Linux kernel. (vs. Capsicum’s [115] fine-grain capabilities).
Since the ptrace capability is too powerful (giving the plu-
gin an ability to kill/hang/corrupt guest processes), we use
seccomp to block the ‘harmful’ system calls which this capa-
bility enables–ptrace() and process_vm_writev().
Thus, by blending the ptrace capability with seccomp, we
achieve our goal of giving the plugin just enough power to
only read, and not impact, the guest’s memory state.
6. Access to network state. As before, being in its own net-
work namespace prevents the plugin from seeing the guest’s
network connections. To enable reading such state, the guest
container’s network namespace is shared with the sandbox.
The plugin can still not perform any packet-level data col-
lection because of its unprivileged status. For passive collec-
tion, such as netflow data [35], CAP_NET_RAW capability
can also be granted to the the sandbox. This does not allow
in-line packet modification and insertion.
However, access to the guest’s network namespace does
open up two avenues of nefarious actions by the plugin. First,
although the unprivileged plugin cannot disrupt the guest’s
network connections, it can use it to communicate with the
outside world– create backdoors, steal secrets, act as botnet,
etc. To avoid this, netfilter-based packet filtering is employed
to block a plugin’s access to the outside world, except for
possibly a secure communication channel to ship out collected
data to the monitoring backend.
The second concern is a potential DoS attack by the plugin,
where the plugin can hoard all of the unprivileged network
ports the guest has access to (cgroups doesn’t prevent this)
This can then prevent a guest application to communicate via
network, if it hasn’t already bound to its desired port. One
option can be to use seccomp to block the bind() syscall by
the plugin. But a plugin may legitimately be using local ports
for data collection, or binding to a unix domain socket [109]3.
Alternatively, we use SElinux to allow only a few ports for
the plugin to bind to.
7. Access to resource stats. Since the plugin is run in a sepa-
rate cgroup for resource isolation, in order to gather the guest
container’s resource usage stats, the plugin is also granted
access to the guest’s cgroup filesystem. DAC settings ensure
read-only behaviour by default.
8. Access by software core. To allow the software core to
command and control the isolated plugin’s execution, a secure
communication path is set up between the plugin sandbox
and the core software. Section 5.1 describes a potential sce-
nario. This is the only way a plugin communicates with an
external entity- only options being the software core and the
monitoring backend (not shown in the figure).
4.1 Limitations
Artifacts. Since the plugin sandbox shares the guest con-
tainer’s PID namespace, the latter can ‘see’ processes from a
foreign user seemingly running inside its context. Although it
does ‘pollute’ the guest’s view, but this is harmless because
of the checks we put in place to avoid any guest impact. This
can be ‘fixed’ by modifying relevant utilities, such as ps, or
docker top, to mask the plugin container’s processes.
Visibility vs. Security Trade-off. In our sandbox, we also
block localhost (127.0.0.1; namespaced) access. This is be-
cause, even though we have guards in place to prevent exploits
to the guest container via memory (privilege separation, no
ptrace(), R/O /proc/<pid>/mem, no /dev/mem access), or
disk (R/O rootfs), a plugin may abuse its proximity to the
guest container to mount network attacks over the localhost
interface. For example, not all ports of the guest container
may be exposed to the outside world, some may just be in-
ternal, accessible over a VPN. In this case, the host-local
plugin sandbox provides a better avenue for attack against a
vulnerable application running inside the guest container (Sec-
tion 6.1). Although blocking the access to localhost thwarts
these attacks, but it may disable a legitimate plugin which col-
lects runtime state by accessing local services (e.g. querying
number of active workers from apache’s status webpage). Al-
though app-specific solutions can be employed (like allowing
http/GET over localhost, but not POST, for the apache case),
but it is not a generic fix across all applications. There thus
exists a visibility vs. security trade-off.
Active-events vs. Isolation Trade-off. The sandbox de-
sign allows event-based data collection, e.g. (i) perf-event
sampling such as via perf_event_open() (allowed by
CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability), or (ii) network packet cap-
ture (allowed when CAP_NET_RAW is conferred). However,
these may negatively impact the guest’s performance (and can
3Seccomp-BPF won’t solve the selective bind() case since a filter won’t
be able to dereference a pointer– the syscall arg containing the port info.
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thus optionally be disallowed). Syscall tracing, on the other
hand, cannot be performed inside the sandbox, due to a dis-
allowed ptrace() for guest’s protection (Section 4, Step 5).
There thus exists a trade-off between enabling active-events
collection vs. isolating its impact, although protecting an en-
tity from event-sampling overhead is an orthogonal problem.
5 Implementation
There exist several container engines for a container’s life-
cycle management, such as LXC, Docker, rkt and OpenVZ
amongst others. We use Docker containers [12] in our imple-
mentation, but our sandboxing approach, being based upon
fundamental kernel-level constructs, is applicable to the other
engines as well. We did not need (or want) to modify the ker-
nel; we were able to build our sandbox with already-exported
kernel functionality. Furthermore, we did not have to modify
Docker either, since it already exposes various runtime flags
which allowed us to invoke the relevant OS-level constructs
to implement our desired sandbox, as described in Section 4.
Note that a regular container by itself, including a Docker
container, is insufficient to serve as a data collection sandbox.
We use a sidecar container pattern [15] to implement our
sandbox. Specifically, the plugins are run inside a separate
container than the target guest container. This puts the plugin
container in its own private set of namespaces, except for
PID and NET namespaces, which are shared with the guest
container using commandline options -pid, -net. Being a
separate container, the plugins are put into a separate cgroup
by default. The corresponding limits on the container’s re-
source usage can be set via -cpus, -memory, -pids-limit,
etc. The plugin container is run as an unprivileged user, differ-
ent than the guest container user, in a separate user namespace
than the host’s4. The guest container’s rootfs (in read-only
mode), as well as cgroup filesystem, is also mounted inside
the plugin container by using the -volume flag. All relevant
capabilities are provided to the plugin using Linux’s setcap
utility, while also enabling the same in the plugin container’s
bounding set via -cap-add commandline option.
In terms of restraints, the relevant seccomp rules are added
to the plugin container via -security-opt seccomp flag.
Relevant iptable rules are set up within the plugin container’s
network namespace context using ip-netns utility. Cgroups-
based matching (via the net_cls controller) is used to drop
packets to/from the plugin container. In our prototype, we use
the plugin container’s rootfs as a communication channel.
5.1 End-to-end Execution Environment
In this Section, we describe a potential end-to-end scenario of
running a plugin, inside a sandbox, against a guest container.
Where do the plugins come from? The plugins can be third-
party or guest-authored (no need to sandbox then!). They
may be hosted at any third-party server, or a central repo
4 Docker currently does not support per-container user namespace [83]
(like Nagios Exchange [87]), or in an object store under the
guest user’s account. In a particular file in the guest con-
tainer’s rootfs (say plugins-to-run), the guest user specifies
weblinks to download the plugin files from, or simply the
plugin name/ID, depending upon the hosting scenario.
How do the plugins get run? One option is for the software
core on the host to fetch the plugins mentioned in the plugins-
to-run file, put them inside a plugin container, and initiate, say,
a plugin-runner process in there, with relevant arguments e.g.
collection frequency. Alternatively, the software core creates a
plugin container first, then initiates the plugin-runner process
in there, which further fetches the plugins from the hosting
store, as listed in the plugins-to-run file (accessible via R/O
mounted guest rootfs). The difference in case of the second
option is that the network-blocking needs to be set up after
the plugin fetch step. The plugin-runner then runs the plugins
at the set frequency. Note that the since the plugins never get
run outside the sandbox, an adversarial plugin’s attempts to
sense its environment before exposing its attack is futile.
How is the plugin output collected and sent to the back-
end?One option is to dump the plugin’s data collection output
into a local file inside the plugin container. This is then read,
parsed and format-validated [99] by the software core, then
emitted to the monitoring backend. Or, the plugin container
may be allowed to emit collected data directly to the backend
over a secure communication channel (with corresponding
exception added into the iptables). Output format verification
and rate throttling then becomes the backend’s responsibility,
although some throttling can be employed at host.
6 Evaluation
Here we evaluate the security posture of our sandbox, as well
as it’s applicability and overhead to systems data extraction.
6.1 Security Analysis
Selection of Exploits. In order to test the efficacy of our sand-
box, we considered a comprehensive set of attack categories,
and verified the inability of the exploits to impact the guest
container or the host system. We focused on the categories
from the Exploit Database–a public archive of exploits used
by penetration testers [90]. These include: local & privilege
escalation, denial of service (DoS), remote exploits, as well as
web application exploits. We also considered all of the attack
categories from the popular Hansman and Hunt’s attack tax-
onomy [62], namely: virus, worms, trojans, buffer overflows,
DoS, network attacks, password attacks, information gather-
ing, information corruption, information disclosure, service
theft and subversion attacks, combined across all of the attack
classification dimensions of the taxonomy.
The first three columns of Table 2 show how the attack
vectors we consider (column 1), to portray possible avenues
of attack specific to a cloud monitoring setting and covering
each of the above categories, map to them (column 2,3). An
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indirect impact. For example, a code injection attack has a
direct process-corruption impact, but not an output falsifica-
tion attack, where the plugin falsely states that the guest is
out of memory, potentially triggering a policy-driven guest re-
instantiation. This is indicated as a ‘Y’ or an ‘N’ in columns
4 and 5, referring to the ability, or lack thereof, of an exploit
to directly infect the guest, when run inside the guest or the
host (column 4), and the sandbox (column 5).
Impact of Out-of-Scope Exploits. The first 7 attacks are
out-of-scope of our threat model (Section 3.1) and are high-
lighted as ‘OOS’ in Column 1 of Table 2. The first 4 of these
are indirect-impact causing, like the aforementioned output
falsification attack. Another indirect-impact case is that of a
compromised monitoring backend, where, for example, the
adversary gains access to guest’s credentials shipped by the
plugin, enabling remote access to the guest. Similar is the
case of a compromised host, where the plugin is able to leak
sensitive guest information to a host-local accomplice via
host-level side channels. A fourth indirect-impact attack vec-
tor is output format exploitation, where a malicious plugin
writes badly formatted data to its output file, in the hope of ex-
ploiting programming errors in the software core (e.g. buffer
overflow). A successful subsequent subversion or privilege
escalation can then potentially impact the guest negatively.
For that reason, it is important to carefully audit the interface
to the core, which is unique to each software [97]. Output
volume-based exploits, on the other hand, are in-scope and
isolated using the blkio (block IO) cgroup controller.
The rest of the out-of-scope exploits are powerful enough
to cause a direct guest impact. This includes attacks against a
weakly configured guest. The sandbox cannot guard against
the case, when, for example, the guest has insecure setuid
binaries [80] lying around. Since the plugin has access to
the read-only mounted guest rootfs, it can execute such a
binary5 to potentially escalate is privileges to that of the guest
user, enabling full write-access to all of guest state. Another
instance is that of a weakly configured guest application. If
such an application is accessible over local/unix sockets with
permissive DAC controls, the plugin can use password attacks
to authorize itself to modify application state.
A buggy kernel is also out-of-scope, although, in some
cases, running kernel-bug-exploitation based plugins within
the sandbox may reduce their impact, as opposed to when
they’re run on the host or the guest. Consider for example
the Dirty Cow privilege escalation exploit [46]. It exploits a
race condition bug in the kernel code, where an unprivileged
user (the plugin) can gain write access to otherwise read-only
memory mappings and thus increase its privilege. On being
executed, the exploit overwrote the plugin’s read-only mem-
ory mappings of the guest’s /usr/bin/passwd executable,
and injected a shell payload inside it, subsequently enabling a
shell access to the guest with the guest user’s privileges. How-
5Restrictive DAC controls can help mitigate this.
ever, even after a successful exploit, although the sandboxed
plugin could kill guest processes, but it was unable to modify
guest’s rootfs (read-only) or steal guest’s secrets (networking
disabled), unlike if it would have been guest or host-resident.
Impact of In-Scope Exploits. The different constraints
added to the sandbox enable it to contain all of the in-scope
exploits (row number 8 onwards), which would have other-
wise directly impacted a guest container, assuming they were
shipped inside third-party plugins. This is indicated as an ‘N’
in Column 5, referring to the inability of an exploit to infect
the guest, when the former is run inside the sandbox. Com-
pare this to the scenario when the exploit (masquerading as a
legitimate plugin) is run inside the guest or the host–a ‘Y’ in
Column 4, indication successful guest infection.
Column 6 shows how the different exploits get thwarted
inside our sandbox. Kernel-level rootkits are trivial to guard
against as the corresponding Linux capabilities to install ker-
nel modules or access /dev/kmem are not given by default to
unprivileged containers, including guests. Data corruption at-
tacks, which can cause DoS to the guest by blocking its access
to its own files (for example, encryption by a ransomware),
are also easy to prevent by virtue of only read access provided
to the plugin sandbox over guest’s files, as opposed to write.
The next set of attacks also cause DoS by exhausting pro-
cess counts, or hogging CPU, memory, disk or network re-
sources. We tested these attacks by running inside the sand-
box: (i) a trivial shell fork bomb, (ii) the stress resource
hog utility, (iii) a zip bomb that explodes in space during un-
zipping, and (iv) a port hijacking script that tries to hoard all
ports for itself so that the guest processes have none left to
bind to. We verified containment of these DoS attacks, as well
as continued access to its allocated resources by the guest.
These operations of a hypothetical plugin are unable to impact
the guest, due to their isolation inside a separate cgroup than
the guest, and resource-limit enforcement. The attack-specific
details are shown in rows 10-12 of Table 2.
The next set of exploits try to alter the guest’s memory
state, by corrupting or crashing any guest process, injecting
malicious code inside it, or duping it to link to malicious
libraries. Direct signaling (such as to suspend or terminate a
process) is thwarted via privilege separation6. Most of these
attacks require either (i) ptrace() to attach to the target
process (guest’s), which is however blocked for the sandbox,
or (ii) write access to the guest process’ /proc/pid/mem,
which is only available as read-only to the plugin, owing
to DAC controls, or (iii) /dev/mem-based access to global
system memory, which is not mounted inside the unprivileged
plugin sandbox. Furthermore, escalation may not be possible
with library hooking, which does not work with setuid binaries.
Then, without direct process modification, library hooking
requires a guest-initiated process be linked to a malicious
6Permission checks for sending signals can be bypassed via CAP_KILL
capability, which is not granted to the plugin.
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library which, however, does not exist on the guest’s rootfs,
while the latter also being unmodifiable (mounted read-only).
The last column of Table 2, in the 5th-and-6th-last rows, lists
the specific instances of these categories of attacks, which we
verified with our sandbox.
With direct process modification disabled, another nefari-
ous avenue is covert operations via backdoors, reverse shells,
processes with fake names, for-profit botnets, and the like.
But due to their reliance on network access, this is neutral-
ized by cutting off the sandbox’ communication with the
outside world. Furthermore, hidden processes, or processes
under fake names, still remain deprivileged and under all of
the sandbox-enforced constraints, making them harmless to
the guest, visible on the host [57], and impact-guarded via
separate cgroups.
This network-access block, including via the loopback in-
terface, also averts privilege escalation attacks against vul-
nerable applications, which may already be running inside
the guest container. We verified this by running metasploit
exploits from within the sandbox against multiple guest ap-
plications. One technique is to exploit via crafted inputs, as
is the case with exploits targetting a stack buffer overflow
vulnerability in MySQL (CVE-2008-0226), and a command
execution vulnerability in Samba (CVE-2007-2447), for ex-
ample. In the latter case, a shell can be obtained by the plugin
under the guest’s credentials, by connecting to Samba using a
username containing shell meta characters (using its username
map script feature). No authentication is needed to exploit
this vulnerability since the username mapping happens prior
to authentication. Another technique the plugin can employ,
is to set up a malicious webserver for the guest container to
inadvertently connect to. The de-serialization vulnerability in
JVM (CVE-2008-5353) is one such example, in which case
the java applet that subsequently runs, exploits a flaw in the
JVM’s deserialization of Calendar object on the guest side,
to execute a shell for the plugin under the guest’s privileges.
The sandbox was able to successfully thwart these attacks
against guest applications, which otherwise succeeded when
the unprivilged plugin ran on the host or the guest, as shown
in the 2nd-last row of Table 2.
With the network route blocked, a disk-based route is
also available for privilege escalation attacks by the plu-
gin, owing to its host-local proximity to the guest container.
An interesting case is a vulnerability exploitation in the
chkroot-kit [34] anti-rootkit software itself! In this case
(CVE-2014-0476), a plugin can elevate its privileges simply
by creating a file named update, with a shell payload, inside
the guest’s or host’s /tmp/ directory. Such disk-based attacks
however trivially fail in case of the sandbox, since the guest’s
rootfs is accessible as read-only.
Summary: By blocking the potential avenues of attack,
our sandbox comprehensively protects the guest from ma-
licious plugin behaviour, while allowing legitimate system-
state-extraction operations.
6.1.1 Discussion
(i) chroot() is not a security hole for us; we employ it only
for existing libs to operate in an expected in-guest view. The
actual protection is from the stronger namespace abstraction.
(ii) Base container integrity. We also consider attacks
which attempt to break out of the base namespace abstraction
/ docker containerization abstraction as being out-of-scope,
and classify them under the ‘kernel bugs’ category. As the
containerization abstraction matures, these ‘attacks’ will even-
tually be neutralized, e.g. Shocker [53]. There exist comple-
mentary work which target containerization security [54,103].
(iii) Privacy. Although a compromised monitoring back-
end is out-of-scope of our threat model, we can still help miti-
gate corresponding exploits. We can employ network sniffers
or look at the plugin’s output contents to search for ‘sensitive
information’, which can be blocked from being shipped out
to the backend. We can also guard against encrypted plugin
output, by pro-actively blocking reads to sensitive files/dirs.
6.2 Applicability
The creation of the sandbox itself is independent of a data
collection tool, and follows the implementation laid out in
Section 5 To use this sandbox, however, the tool needs to
be modified to support a ‘sandbox mode’. This mode calls
the sandbox creation routine, and implements the command-
and-control interaction hooks with the sandboxed plugins, as
discussed in Section 5.1, which are tool-dependent. To test
the applicability of our sandbox, we selected an extensible
opensource tool- ASC [36], because it already supports mod-
ular runtime modes—in terms of state extraction from VMs,
containers, and hosts. Adding the sandbox mode to it boiled
down to inheriting a base data-collector class and extending it
to run ASC’s plugins inside our sandbox, instead of running
them on the host or the guest container.
We were able to run all of its plugins which are relevant in
the setting of containerized guests running on a host system,
except for application-level plugins such as Apache and Redis
(coverage: 15/19 plugins). This is under the sandbox’s strict
security-over-visibility restriction which blocks querying lo-
cal services (e.g. apache status webpage). For ASC, relaxing
this restriction to allow HTTP GETs over (guest’s) localhost,
enables the sandbox to support all of ASC’s plugins, without
compromising on security, as discussed in Section 4.1.
For usability, it is important for the sandbox to be able to run
existing plugins with no or minimal modifications, so as to be
able to reuse existing plugin code. For ASC, most plugins ran
unmodified. While in other cases, only minor modifications
were needed- (i) avoiding setns() namespace jumping [21]
for PID and network namespace, since the plugins already
share them with the guest container, (ii) calling chroot()
over the guest’s R/O-mounted rootfs, to reuse existing disk-
based data collection logic, and (iii) directing the CPU and
memory plugins to gather guest’s resource usage stats from
the guest’s cgroup filesystem mounted locally in the sandbox.
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The outputs from the plugins were verified to match when
run within and without the sandbox mode.
We analyzed the sandbox’ applicability to Nagios and
Sensu tools as well, which have many more plugins owing
to their maturity and popularity in the community. We did
not modify these tools to support the sandbox mode, but ana-
lyzed their plugins’ code to ascertain possible execution under
sandboxing. Amongst the official Nagios plugins, 42 are ap-
plicable to a cloud environment. Amongst those, the sandbox
can support all 28 plugins which collect system-local infor-
mation. The rest 14 talk to auxiliary system services over the
network, such as DNS, SMTP, DHCP, NTP, ping and the like,
which is disabled for the sandbox.
There are no ‘official’ Sensu plugins, so we analyzed its
community plugins from its Github organization. Similar to
the Nagios analysis, the sandbox can run 71 of the 80 system-
level checks (sensu-plugins-*-checks repositories), the
unsupported ones being the hardware-level checks interfac-
ing with RAID controllers, and hardware sensors. Allowing
read-only localhost access (Section 4.1), allows the sandbox
to also support the application-level plugins as well, such
as those collecting stats for Cassandra, Mongodb, Apache,
etc. However, plugins which call service APIs over the net-
work to collect data, such as from Amazon Web Services,
Kubernetes, and Jenkins, etc., suffer under sandboxing, which
doesn’t allow communication with outside world.
Takeaways: (i) The applicability coverage for system-
level data extraction plugins is high. (ii) Since a major-
ity of application-level plugins across ASC, Sensu and Na-
gios community exchange [87], follow the same approach to
query application status, plugin-applicability coverage can
be vastly improved by relaxing HTTP GETs over localhost
(guest’s; namespaced), without compromising on security.
(iii) Coverage can potentially be further improved, if a trusted
host:port whitelisting scheme can be enabled for plugins
which query services over the network. (iv) ‘Active events
vs. isolation tradeoff’ (Section 4.1) is not so pronounced,
as many of the sandbox-able plugins already include active
events surfaced via procfs.
6.3 Performance
In this set of experiments, we measure the overhead our sand-
box introduces to a normal systems data collection flow, in
terms of sandbox creation latency, running time degradation,
and resource consumption. Setup: We ran our experiments
on a Ubuntu 16.04 KVM VM, with 4 vCPUs and 8G RAM,
running Docker 1.12.1. The VM runs on quad-core / 16G
RAM / Intel Core-i7 2.80GHz host machine, running Ubuntu
16.04 and QEMU 2.5.0. We use python:2.7 as our Docker
container image, to which we added all of ASC’s plugins. All
reported results are averages over 10 runs.
First off, it takes 344ms to setup the sandbox, compared
to 273ms to run a guest container. Next, to measure the over-
head of running the plugins inside our sandbox, we compared
ASC’s data collection cycle duration while running it’s plu-
gins in two configurations- (i) inside a guest container, and
(ii) inside our plugin container prototype. We selected all of
the plugins (as in Section 6.2) to run in each data collection
cycle of ASC. A small difference was recorded in the running
time of the plugins- none in the initial cycle (210ms), but an
increase from 26ms/cycle (inside guest) to 30ms/cycle (inside
sandbox), when amortized across 300 continuous cycles.
Finally, no extra resource consumption overhead was ob-
served when running the plugins inside the sandbox as op-
posed to the guest container. The base memory usage of an
inactive sandbox container is 176KB (same as any regular
container), which rises to 19.6MB after 300 continuous data
collection cycles- precisely the memory used by the guest
container if the plugins are run inside it instead. The plugin
container’s CPU usage is also similar to the case of the guest
container running the plugins.
We also verified that no extra sandboxing-related overhead
is imposed upon the guest container workload. Although non-
stop data collection cycles impact a sysbench CPU benchmark
running inside the guest by 3.2%, the impact is same irrespec-
tive of where the plugins are run- on the host, the sandbox or
guest itself (separate core). It is as per expectations that no
extra impact be observed, owing to cgroups-based isolation.
7 Related Work
Existing approaches which may be employed for plugin veri-
fication or sandboxing can be categorized as follows:
Privilege separation: Compartmentalization is one of the
first building blocks towards application security, and can be
done manually via application restructuring [65,84, 97], but
with significant programmer effort [115], or automatically via
program analysis [28, 30, 61]. Fortunately, most extensible
software have this logical partitioning–core vs. plugins. We
employ privilege separation in our sandbox, by running the
plugins as unprivileged entities, with access to privileged
guest state being mediated by other kernel constructs.
Code analysis: One way to validate a third-party plugin code
is to employ code analysis techniques [26,40,45,48,50,71,
111], which may help detect and avoid attacks such as buffer
overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and API misusages.
However, instead of exploiting programming errors, the plugin
may employ other mechanisms, such as code obfuscation [37,
73], to perform nefarious actions (e.g., DoS, leaking secrets,
or acting as botnet). Our sandbox, on the other hand, contains
the exposure while remaining agnostic of any plugin code.
Code transformation:Another approach can be to transform
the plugin code so that its instructions can be verified before
they are allowed to execute, so as to satisfy any security policy.
This transformation can be done statically (SFI) [49,112,117],
or dynamically (SDT) [52,104]. However, these high complex-
ity solutions can impose a significant overhead on program
execution, are limited to specific architectures, and provide
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less assurance than simpler hardware-based mechanism [56].
Our sandbox, on the other hand, uses generic OS-exported
functionality, and has a low impact on plugin execution.
SystemCall Interposition (SCI): Syscall-based filtering [22,
27, 33,41, 56,58, 63, 67,69, 82,96] can also be employed to
allow or deny a plugin’s access to privileged/sensitive sys-
tem state. Given the scale (and constant growth) of syscalls
in the Linux kernel [77], creating and maintaining a robust-
yet-generic syscall filter policy becomes a very complex and
error-prone task [115]. Some SCI-based tools can also be
circumvented, e.g. via ‘time of check/time of use’ race condi-
tion exploitation [55,114]. Also, a syscall access policy alone
does not suffice, since it might be necessary to lock down the
system view visible to a plugin (Figure 2). That’s why our
sandbox employs other building blocks in addition to this.
Language-based sandboxing A programming language run-
time barrier can also be used to restrict a plugin’s oper-
ations and access to privileged state. This is usually ac-
companied by a restriction in the language functionality,
such as limiting the set of external modules which can be
loaded, or whitelisting and making internal built-ins read-
only [23, 31, 32, 60, 64, 76, 79, 81, 113]. However, this turns
out be a complex and error-prone task [93]. For example,
an author’s attempt to provide language-level sandboxing
purely in python failed, to an extent where it was deemed
necessary to put the whole Python process inside an external
sandbox to guarantee security [110]. Furthermore, any bug
in the programming language VM can still pose a threat [92].
Consequently, alternative language sandboxing solutions re-
sort to OS-level sandboxing approaches [47,59, 89, 98]. Our
sandbox also uses OS-level constructs, thereby sidestepping
the pitfalls of enforcing such language restrictions.
OS isolation: The kernel constructs to manage access rights
and restrictions, by themselves, are insufficient for comprehen-
sive sandboxing. As pointed out in [115], DAC/MAC are inad-
equate for application privilege separation. Fine-grained Type
Enforcement policies (as in SElinux) are inflexible, difficult
to write and maintain, and thus, in practice, broad rights are
conferred. Chroot limits only file system access, and switch-
ing credentials via setuid offers poor protection against weak
DAC protections on namespaces. Namespaces-based view
separation itself precludes cross-domain (e.g., a container)
visibility. Linux capabilities, in their current form, still confer
too much power than required for fine-grained access con-
trol. Capsicum [115] enables finer granularity capabilities via
file-descriptor-level access control. However, since it com-
bines security policy with code in the application, this makes
it harder to cleanly specify and analyze a security policy. It
also requires kernel modifications, and (minor) application
modifications to make use of the proposed kernel construct.
As we’ve shown, a combination of these constructs is
needed to get the right mix of accessibility and restrictions
required for sandboxing systems data collection plugin.
Hardware virtualization: Hardware virtualization primi-
tives can also be used to isolate plugin code. Examples of
application-level sandboxing include KVMsandbox [25] and
libvirt-sandbox [42]. Microvirtualization (Bromium [29]),
compartmentalization (QubesOS [100]), and unikernel [75]
approaches are also potential sandboxing options. Such a
setup would still require secure mechanism to provide VM-
to-VM or VM-to-host visibility (required for state extraction
plugins). We are able to leverage kernel-exported functional-
ity to easily achieve this in our sandbox design.
Amongst the security solutions employing a combination
of techniques for different use-cases [51, 68, 72, 78, 102], the
Firejail [51] sandbox comes closest to our approach. Although
its set of kernel control knobs is similar to ours, but the manner
of tuning those knobs differs since it needs a different blend
of access and control owing to its different target usecase.
Taking example of just namespaces alone, in case of firejail
each sandboxed application is give its own private set of
namespaces. This would not work for the sandboxed plugins
of a monitoring software, since they need to access the target
endpoints’ namespace to extract relevant system state. Our
sandbox facilitates this access in a secure manner.
WatchIT [106] also uses containers to create a sandbox.
But its usecase, as well as the capabilities and formation of
its sandbox is very different to ours. Taking just one example
of its sandbox’ permissions, since it allows (controlled) root
access it becomes too permissive for data collection plugins.
But this makes sense for the use-case it targets–IT admins and
third-party contractors, who may need root access to perform
necessary IT actions. Our sandbox is able to provide a read-
only, non-root access sufficient for third-party plugins. Fur-
thermore, since WatchIT’s sandbox is much more permissive
than ours, it requires potentially heavyweight monitoring and
logging of network traffic and filesystem accesses, to avoid po-
tential attacks, which we don’t. WatchIT also requires kernel
modifications unlike our solution.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented our sandbox mechanism to
enable secure extensibility for systems data extraction soft-
ware. We described how we protect the software core and the
monitored guest from potentially malicious plugins, by isolat-
ing the plugins inside a sandbox environment, while allowing
legitimate plugins to collect system state, by granting them
read-only visibility into the guest system. We presented a sur-
vey of existing monitoring software to highlight the need for
a secure plugin sandbox. We highlighted the strong security
posture of our sandbox, by verifying successful containment
of several exploits across multiple dimensions. We demon-
strated its applicability and low state extraction overhead, by
sandboxing plugins of an existing data collection software
against containerized guest systems. We have opensourced
our sandbox, and invite community feedback.
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